

PROHIBITING AND PREVENTING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS:

Background Information for Parliamentarians on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

THIRD EDITION

Contents

1. Preface	
2. Basic obligations	3
3. Why ratify the CTBT?.....	4
4. Scope of the CTBT	6
5. History and significance of the CTBT	6
6. Membership benefits	7
7. National implementation measures	7
8. The National Authority	8
9. Checklist for legislators.....	9
10. Ratifying States	10
11. Signatory States which have not yet ratified	10
12. Non-signatory States	10
13. Entry into force requirements.....	11
14. Resolutions by the Inter-Parliamentary Union.....	11

1. Preface

This publication has been prepared to assist parliamentarians and other officials to prepare for ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The publication presents a summary of the basic provisions of the CTBT as well as background information regarding the CTBT and the rights and obligations a State Party will assume upon its entry-into-force.

2. Basic obligations

Article 1

1. *Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.*

2. *Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.*

3. Why ratify the CTBT?



With 185 signatures and 170 ratifications, the CTBT is one of the most adhered-to instruments in its field. The reasons behind such widespread support are clear: first, by prohibiting and preventing nuclear test explosions, the CTBT makes an essential contribution to peace and security, both regionally and globally. It constrains the development and improvement of nuclear weapons, making it much more difficult for States to acquire a first nuclear device or develop more powerful weapons. As such, it builds confidence between States – especially in regions haunted by the spectre of nuclear war – and makes a very tangible contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Support for the CTBT also derives from the nature of the Treaty itself, which is comprehensive in every sense of the word: it bans *all* nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions; it fills the lacuna of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) by ensuring that tests are prohibited in *all* environments – including underground; it applies in the same way to *all* Member States, regardless of their nuclear status or any other consideration; and it provides *all* Member States with equal access to the data generated by the Treaty’s monitoring system, enabling them to participate on an equal footing in the Treaty’s verification.

The Treaty’s verifiability, in effect, gives it significant political value. Not only does it reassure States that no nuclear test will go undetected – with the added benefit that those with malevolent intent will be deterred from trying to clandestinely test a weapon –, but it also makes other similar undertakings truly verifiable. Members of nuclear-weapon-free zones, for example, have already positioned themselves legally against nuclear testing; the CTBT strengthens this undertaking by reaffirming it on a global scale and submitting it to a verification mechanism.

In addition, access to the raw data and data products generated by a science-based international organization ensures that, even in complex situations involving possible nuclear testing, Member States that do not possess their own monitoring capabilities are able to take independent and informed decisions. The detection of the announced nuclear tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016 and 2017 is a good example of how the technical underpinnings of these developments provided the basis for States’ consideration of the matter.

Though unwelcome, these same events also acted as a performance test for the CTBT monitoring system as a whole, promptly supplying Member States with information on the time, depth, location and magnitude of each event. It quickly became clear that the system had greatly improved over the

years, and that it had reached a high level of reliability. Without any doubt, the system's performance in such times of trial has also contributed to the widespread support for the CTBT.

In the same vein, the vast potential of civil and scientific applications of CTBT monitoring technologies has increasingly been seen as a valuable spinoff of the Treaty's verification system. The measurements made in the context of the tragic Tohoku earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident at Fukushima-Daiichi in March 2011 highlighted the system's readiness to contribute strongly to disaster mitigation efforts, notably through collaboration with tsunami warning centres.

This is the time, therefore, to act upon our own destiny and that of future generations, demonstrate political leadership, and *prevent the preventable* by prohibiting once and for all nuclear test explosions.

4. Scope of the CTBT

The object and purpose of the CTBT is to ban comprehensively nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosion in an effectively verifiable manner. By constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, it plays a crucial role in the prevention of nuclear proliferation and in nuclear disarmament, thus contributing to a safer and more secure world.

When the Treaty enters into force it will establish an international organization (the CTBTO) to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for the verification of compliance with the Treaty. The regime established for verification purposes includes an International Monitoring System (IMS) supported by an International Data Centre (IDC) located at the headquarters of the CTBTO in Vienna, Austria. The Treaty also provides for confidence-building measures and, should concern remain over possible non-compliance with the Treaty, a consultation and clarification process. Ultimately, Member States may request the CTBTO to carry out an on-site inspection by to clarify whether a nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of the Treaty.

Pending entry into force, the IMS and IDC are already being provisionally operated by the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO and its Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna. Seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide data is collected by the stations of the IMS and distributed to Member States via the IDC. The IDC also processes the raw data received from the stations to derive objective products and services which will support the Treaty verification responsibilities.

5. History and significance of the CTBT

The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT; sometimes also referred to as the Limited Test-Ban Treaty or LTBT) entered into force in 1963. It has currently 135 State Parties and bans nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, as well as any other environment if the explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.

After multiple unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a comprehensive test ban, the CTBT was finally negotiated and drafted in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and opened for signature in New York in 1996. The conclusion of the CTBT thus achieved one goal of the States Parties to the 1963 PTBT and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon test explosions for all time.

The conclusion of the CTBT was one of the conditions that allowed States Parties to the NPT to agree to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. At its 2000 Review Conference, NPT States Parties concluded that signature, ratification and entry into force of the CTBT are “the first practical step for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT”, with its aim of nuclear disarmament. In that same year, the United Nations Secretary-General included the CTBT as one of the 25 core multilateral treaties representative of the key objectives of the United Nations, prompting many of the States to take action on the CTBT during the Millennium Assembly and thereafter.

6. Membership benefits

Member States that adhere to the Treaty express their support for non-proliferation and disarmament and make a strong contribution to regional and global peace and security, thereby joining a vast community of like-minded States. Each and every signature or ratification strengthens the political value of the CTBT. Even before its entry into force, the CTBT has helped to create a strong international norm against nuclear testing.

The obligations not to carry out any nuclear explosion and to prohibit and prevent any such explosion apply to all Member States, regardless of their nuclear status. The CTBT is thus a strong non-proliferation instrument and a catalyst for nuclear disarmament. Since a nuclear test provides the final and irreversible ‘downstream’ proof of the intentions of a State regarding its pursuit of a nuclear weapons programme, the CTBT thus constitutes the last and clearly visible barrier between the peaceful legitimate use and the misuse of nuclear energy.

The 337 IMS facilities currently being built in accordance with the Treaty (170 seismic, 11 hydroacoustic, 60 infrasound and 80 radionuclide stations, as well as 16 radionuclide laboratories) are located all over the world, including some in the most remote regions such as the Arctic and Antarctica. It is multilateralism at its best: 89 countries from North and South, East and West, host a network of facilities that no country could build and deploy alone. These countries and the exact location of the stations are established by Annex 1 to the Protocol to the Treaty. With more than 90% of the IMS stations installed, preparations for entry into force of the CTBT are well under way.

The nuclear weapon tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have posed the most serious trial of the norm against nuclear testing. International condemnation of these events demonstrated the seriousness of the international community to uphold the global nuclear test ban. These events also imposed performance tests for the IMS, whose timely, integrated and coherent performance, even though not fully complete, demonstrated a high level of reliability. It has proven to be a valuable investment by the Member States to ensure that no nuclear test goes undetected.

Member States are able to receive the raw data as well as processed data products that are transmitted by the IDC through their own National Data Centre (NDC). As part of its capacity-building activities, the Commission can help Member States establish such NDCs by providing assistance with their installation (including software and satellite link to the IDC) and offering Help Desk support, as well as specialized free-of-charge training for station operators and managers.

Member States that have access to the verification data generated by the CTBT monitoring system may also benefit from the utilization of such data in a variety of civil areas, including scientific research, disaster preparedness, meteorological and climate forecasting, and tsunami warning. Currently, more than 2000 users worldwide are receiving data.

7. National implementation measures

There are no mandatory reporting obligations and no routine inspections under the CTBT.

Article III of the CTBT requires each State Party to take, in accordance with its constitutional processes, any necessary measures to implement its obligations under the Treaty.

How

- In some cases, existing national legislation may already be sufficient to implement the State’s obligations under the CTBT.
- In most cases, even in States where treaties automatically form part of national law, existing legislation may need to be amended or supplemented, or a new law may need to be enacted, or subsidiary regulations or administrative measures may need to be adopted. Such measures may include the criminalization of carrying out a nuclear explosion and the granting of privileges and immunities to the CTBTO. Section 9 below enumerates a checklist.

The goal is to give internal legal effect to all of the State’s obligations under the Treaty and, in particular, to enable it to legally enforce those obligations in respect of activities by all persons under its jurisdiction, including by means of sanctions for violations.

Where

- The legislation should apply in the whole territory of the State as well as in any other place under its jurisdiction or control in accordance with international law.
- The legislation should be extended extraterritorially to natural persons possessing the State's nationality, to prohibit such persons from undertaking anywhere any activity prohibited by the Treaty.

When

The required national implementation measures need to be in force at the time the CTBT enters into force. Consequently, arrangements may need to be done in a timely manner beforehand to ensure that national implementation measures will be enforceable once the CTBT is in force.

- In some States that have already adopted CTBT legislation, the legislature has stipulated that the legislation will enter into force when the CTBT does.
- A number of States have already made it a criminal offence to carry out a nuclear explosion or to cause, encourage, attempt, assist with or in any way participate in one. They amended their penal code with immediate effect at the time of ratifying the CTBT or they had already adopted such legislation as nuclear-weapon-free-zone States.
- In other cases, the State has decided to adopt the national normative constraints against nuclear testing with immediate effect, in advance of the CTBT's entry into force, as an environmental, counterterrorism or other policy-based measure.

Since 2004, the adoption and enforcement of effective laws and the establishment of a range of domestic controls aimed at preventing nuclear weapon proliferation among non-State actors, in particular for terrorist purposes, have become the obligation of all States under United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The establishment of the criminal offence of carrying out a nuclear explosion, with penalties appropriate to the seriousness of the crime, together with measures aimed at preventing the acquisition of enabling materials or devices, have a deterrent effect on potential perpetrators of these activities, thus advancing the objectives of nuclear security in the State's jurisdiction and prevent the State's territory from being a safe haven for those who might be interested in pursuing such activities.

Examples of legislation are available from the Commission's Secretariat upon request.

Finally, owing to the extensive activities required to be taken by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and Member States to establish and provisionally operate the IMS and IDC during the preparatory phase, it may be necessary to adopt forthwith national measures to host a monitoring station and enable effective cooperation with the Commission.

8. The National Authority

Article III of the CTBT requires each State Party to designate or set up a National Authority to "serve as the national focal point for liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties".

The core function of the National Authority is to facilitate the interaction between States and with the CTBTO on all matters regarding the implementation of the Treaty after its entry into force. Before entry into force of the Treaty, most Member States have already set up at least an interim National Authority because of the need to cooperate with the Commission in establishing the verification regime.

- For States hosting monitoring facilities, the National Authority usually is the governmental entity which negotiates and promotes the conclusion of the respective Facility Agreement in order to

advance work on the IMS, a system which must be fully operational as a whole at entry into force of the CTBT.

- In other States, the National Authority is cooperating with the Commission in establishing a National Data Centre and developing the national capacity to receive and analyse IMS data, including the training of station personnel.
- Some States have designated as the National Authority, an inter-institutional entity composed of several competent government authorities.

In the event of an on-site inspection after entry into force of the Treaty, the role of the National Authority would be particularly important, considering the negotiations and administrative arrangements required to enable inspection activities to proceed in accordance with the Treaty. Such tasks would include cooperation between the inspected State Party and the CTBTO's Inspection Team, consultations on the mandate of the inspection, the inspection area, and privileges and immunities.

The modality for establishing or designating a National Authority is not regulated by the Treaty and is left to the discretion of the State itself. It is an institutional matter that may be carried out by decree, resolution, ministerial order or other instrument. While it is generally established as a result of general executive powers of the government, in some States it may be necessary to establish the National Authority's mandate and powers by statute, in particular when its powers would affect the rights of third parties or it has been assigned some level of enforcement authority.

Currently, more than 140 Member States have designated their respective National Authorities.

9. Checklist for legislators

The elements to be taken into account when incorporating the Treaty into national law include the following:

9.1. Measures explicitly required

- Prohibition and prevention¹ of nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosion;
- Extension of legislation extraterritorially to natural persons possessing the State's nationality regardless of where the persons commit the act;
- Cooperation with, and provision of legal assistance to, other States Parties;
- Establishment or designation of a National Authority;
- For States hosting an IMS facility, the conclusion of a Facility Agreement and other arrangements, as necessary, to enable site selection, construction, operation, maintenance, upgrade and data transmission.²

9.2. Other elements normally necessary

- Definitions;
- Legislation that is also binding on the government;
- Recognition of the legal capacity of the CTBTO;
- Privileges and immunities of the CTBTO, delegates of its Member States, staff and experts;
- Confidentiality of data;
- Procedures to report chemical explosions above the threshold established by the Treaty;
- Inspection powers and procedures;
- Authority to issue regulations;

¹ As the CTBT is part of the international framework for nuclear security, the legislation enacted to implement the treaty at the national level, in particular the criminalization of Article I of the CTBT, also contributes to the establishment of a robust national nuclear security regime,

² See Article IV, paragraph 22 of the CTBT

- Allocation of budgetary and personnel resources to participate in the CTBTO and its activities.

9.3. Measures which may be necessary during the preparatory phase (in particular to enable the provisional operation of the IMS and IDC during the preparatory phase)

- Establishment or designation of a National Authority and a National Data Centre;
- Recognition of the legal capacity of the Preparatory Commission;
- Granting of privileges and immunities upon the Preparatory Commission, delegates, the Executive Secretary, staff and experts;
- Conclusion of Facility Agreements or Arrangements with the Preparatory Commission;
- Arrangements for the conduct of activities pursuant to the Resolution establishing the Preparatory Commission, including cooperation between the National Authority and the Preparatory Commission;
- Allocation of financial and human resources for participation in the Commission and its activities.

A legislation guide containing model legislation and commentary has been developed and posted in the CTBTO's website in six languages. The Secretariat is also available for consultations or assistance.

10. Ratifying States (as of 9 March 2022)

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria*, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina*, Armenia, Australia*, Austria*, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh*, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium*, Belize, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil*, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria*, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada*, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile*, Colombia*, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland*, France*, Gabon, Georgia, Germany*, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary*, Iceland, Indonesia*, Iraq, Ireland, Italy*, Jamaica, Japan*, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico*, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands*, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia, Norway*, Oman, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru*, Philippines, Poland*, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea*, Republic of Moldova, Romania*, Russian Federation*, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia*, Slovenia, South Africa*, Spain*, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden*, Switzerland*, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey*, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine*, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam*, Zambia, and Zimbabwe

11. Signatory States which have not yet ratified (as of 9 March 2022)

China*, Egypt*, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Iran (Islamic Republic of)*, Israel*, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, United States of America*, and Yemen

12. Non-signatory States (as of 9 March 2022)

Bhutan, Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, Dominica, India*, Mauritius, Pakistan*, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Tonga.

13. Entry into force

The CTBT will enter into force 180 days after it has been ratified by the 44 States listed in Annex 2. These 44 States formally participated in the negotiations of the Treaty and possessed nuclear power reactors or research reactors at the time. Eight of those States have not yet ratified the Treaty.¹

14. Resolutions by the Inter-Parliamentary Union

14.1. Resolutions 1995–2013

The Inter-Parliamentary Union has adopted a series of resolutions in which either explicit reference is made to the CTBT or the stated aims are consistent with those of the CTBT:

- The Importance of Adhering to the Obligations Specified in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (91st Inter-Parliamentary Conference/Paris, 1994)
- To Comprehensively Ban Nuclear Weapons Testing and Halt All Present Nuclear Weapons Tests (94th Inter-Parliamentary Conference/Bucharest, 1995)
- Parliamentary Action to Encourage all Countries to Sign and Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Prohibiting All Nuclear Testing, to Encourage Universal and Non-discriminatory Nuclear Non-Proliferation Measures and to Work Towards the Eventual Elimination of All Nuclear Weapons (101st Inter-Parliamentary Conference/Brussels, 1999)
- Importance of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction and of Missiles, Including the Prevention of their Use by Terrorists (108th Inter-Parliamentary Conference/Santiago (Chile), 2003)
- The Role of Parliaments in Assisting Multilateral Organisations in Ensuring Peace and Security and in Building an International Coalition for Peace (109th IPU Assembly/Geneva, 2003)
- The Announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its Nuclear Weapons Test and the Strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (115th IPU Assembly/Geneva, 2006)
- Advancing Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and Securing the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: the Role of Parliaments (120th IPU Assembly/Addis Ababa, 2009).

14.2. Text of the 2009 Resolution

Advancing Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and Securing the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: the Role of Parliaments

Resolution adopted by consensus by the 120th IPU Assembly (Addis Ababa, 10 April 2009)*

The 120th Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union,

¹ China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Pakistan and United States of America.

Determined to advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to strengthening international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and *underscoring* that substantial progress in the field of nuclear disarmament requires active support and dedicated contributions by all States,

Deeply concerned that the existence in the world of some 26,000 nuclear weapons, whose use can have devastating human, environmental and economic consequences, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming the obligations of nuclear-weapon States under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) towards nuclear disarmament and their unequivocal undertakings under the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences in this regard,

Recalling past IPU resolutions designed to advance the progress of non-proliferation and disarmament and to encourage ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), in particular the one adopted by the 101st Inter-Parliamentary Conference (Brussels, April 1999),

Reaffirming the crucial importance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, which sets out legal obligations in these fields at the same time as it guarantees the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Recalling international conventions and resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council and the IPU on the right to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes,

Concerned that non-compliance with all provisions of the NPT by some States has undermined the three pillars of the NPT and eroded the benefits derived by all States,

Considering the importance of all States ensuring strict compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament obligations,

Recognizing the progress made under the NPT and the resulting safeguards agreements, and *urging* the nuclear-weapon States to fully implement the commitments they undertook during the NPT Review Conferences in 1995 and 2000,

Concerned that, in spite of tireless efforts made by the international community for forty years to ban nuclear explosions in all environments, and thirteen years after it was opened for signature, the CTBT has yet to enter into force,

Convinced that the verified cessation of nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions constitutes an effective disarmament and non-proliferation measure and is a meaningful preliminary step towards nuclear disarmament, but *stressing* that the only way to remove the threat of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of such inhumane weapons,

Stressing that a universal and effectively verifiable CTBT constitutes a fundamental instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,

Underscoring the crucial role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in promoting nuclear cooperation, the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to developing countries, and nuclear non-proliferation, and the need for every State to adopt the non-proliferation safeguards standard of a comprehensive safeguards agreement combined with an additional protocol,

Disappointed that after over a decade, the Conference on Disarmament, the UN multilateral disarmament negotiation body, has yet to agree on a programme of work and resume its important mandate, owing to the divergent views on disarmament negotiation priorities,

Considering the important role played by bilateral disarmament treaties, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, *welcoming* the cuts made by some nuclear-weapon States to their nuclear arsenals and *urging* deeper, faster and irreversible cuts to all types of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-armed States,

Convinced that the best way to guarantee world peace and stability is to take effective measures for international security, including disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing the benefits of confidence-building measures, such as the de-emphasizing of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines and the removal of nuclear weapons systems from high alert status, and *mindful* of the mutual confidence engendered by freely agreed regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as those in the South Pacific, Africa, South-East Asia and Latin America,

Underscoring the importance of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, without exception,

Deeply concerned by the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and by the resulting toll in human life, environmental damage, political tensions, economic loss and market instability,

Pledging to bring about fuller parliamentary involvement in the disarmament process, particularly in respect of nuclear weapons, in the form of greater pressure on governments and detailed scrutiny of military budgets and procurement programmes allocated for nuclear weapons development,

Mindful of the fact that national defence policies should not compromise the fundamental principle of undiminished security for all, and thus *recalling* that any unilateral deployment or build-up of strategic anti-ballistic missile assets affecting the deterrent capacity of nuclear-weapon States might hinder the process of nuclear disarmament,

1. *Calls on* all nuclear-armed States to make deeper, faster and irreversible cuts to all types of nuclear weapons;
2. *Urges* all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and combat the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in accordance with international law;
3. *Underscores* the vital role of the CTBT as part of a framework for achieving nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and *expresses disappointment* that, thirteen years after it was opened for signature, the Treaty has yet to enter into force;
4. *Stresses* the vital importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions, to achieve the earliest entry into force of the CTBT;
5. *Welcomes* the signatures/ratifications of the CTBT in 2008 by Barbados, Burundi, Colombia, Lebanon, Malawi, Malaysia, Mozambique and Timor-Leste;
6. *Calls upon* the parliaments of all States that have not yet signed and ratified the CTBT to exert pressure on their governments to do so;

7. *Especially urges* parliaments of all remaining States listed in Annex 2 of the CTBT, whose ratification is required to bring the treaty into force, to urge their governments to immediately sign and ratify the treaty;
8. *Calls on* all nuclear-armed States to continue to observe their moratoria on nuclear-weapon testing, on all States that have not already done so to proceed, on a voluntary basis, to dismantle their nuclear test sites, and on all States to maintain support for the CTBT Organization verification system until the CTBT enters into force;
9. *Urges* immediate commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices;
10. *Invites* States to initiate negotiations with a view to concluding a treaty on the prohibition of short-range and intermediate-range land missiles that carry nuclear warheads;
11. *Recommends* that States with ballistic missile capacity that have not acceded to the Hague Code of Conduct do so quickly in order to render this instrument completely effective against ballistic missile proliferation;
12. *Calls on* all nuclear-armed States to adopt confidence-building measures, including the de-emphasizing of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines and the removal of all nuclear weapons from high alert status;
13. *Reaffirms* the importance of achieving universal accession to the NPT, and of States not party to the NPT acceding to it promptly and unconditionally as non-nuclear-weapon States, and of all States party to the NPT fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty;
14. *Is hopeful* that the States concerned will be required to sign and comply with safeguards agreements and additional protocols, in particular those concluded in the framework of the IAEA, as a prerequisite for benefiting from international cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for civilian purposes;
15. *Calls on* all States to support the initiatives aimed at globalizing the obligations set forth in the Treaty signed between the United States and the former Soviet Union on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty) and to promote cooperative approaches to the issue of missile defence, beginning with a joint assessment of possible threats;
16. *Calls on* national parliaments to ensure State compliance with all their disarmament and non-proliferation obligations;
17. *Urges* parliaments to provide strong and effective support to all resolutions and recommendations on peace, disarmament and security previously adopted at IPU Conferences and Assemblies;
18. *Encourages* parliaments to monitor closely national implementation of all arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and UN resolutions, to engage their publics on nuclear issues and to report back to the IPU on progress made;
19. *Urges* IAEA Member States or parties to a safeguards agreement to lend strong and constant support to the IAEA so that it can honour its safeguards obligations and therefore to cooperate in good faith with the IAEA by providing it with all information requested;

20. *Calls on* States whose ratification is needed for the entry into force of general safeguards agreements to take the necessary steps to that end as soon as possible;
21. *Further calls on* the States party to a safeguards agreement which have not yet signed and/or ratified an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible;
22. *Recommends* that the United Nations, especially the Office of Disarmament Affairs, and the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization, strengthen cooperation with the IPU;
23. *Invites* the IPU Secretary General to contact, on an annual basis, the parliaments of the States which have not signed and/or ratified the international treaties mentioned in the present resolution with a view to encouraging them to do so;
24. *Urges* parliaments to instruct governments to express their support for the UN Secretary-General's Five Point Proposal contained in his address, "The United Nations and Security in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World";
25. *Encourages* parliaments to support the full ratification and implementation of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to explore the possibility of establishing additional nuclear-weapon-free zones freely agreed by States in specific regions;
26. *Calls for* the necessary steps to be taken to declare the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone, without exception, in keeping with the resolution endorsed by the NPT Review Conference in 1995;
27. *Encourages* all parliaments to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level and, where possible, to promote compliance with the NPT through bilateral and joint outreach, seminars and other means.

* The following delegations expressed reservations on parts of the resolution:

- China – operative paragraphs 10, 11 and 15;
- India – preambular paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 10 and 12 and operative paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 13;
- Iran (Islamic Republic of) – preambular paragraph 18 and operative paragraphs 6, 10, 21 and 26;
- Pakistan – preambular paragraphs 7 and 13 and operative paragraphs 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 and 23.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosion. It aims at eliminating nuclear weapons by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of new or more advanced nuclear weapons.

When the Treaty enters into force, it will establish the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in Vienna, Austria. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO is preparing for entry into force, including the construction and provisional operation of the CTBTO International Monitoring System and assistance with the establishment of National Data Centres.

As of 9 March 2022, 185 States had signed and 170 States had ratified the CTBT.

For assistance with national implementation, contact:

**Legal Services Section
Legal and External Relations Division
Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)
Vienna International Centre
P.O. Box 1200
1400 Vienna, Austria**

Tel.: +43 1 26030 6277

Fax: +43 1 26030 5976

Email: Legal.Registry@ctbto.org